


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Latin America

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

State Dept. review completed

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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OAS General Assembly VII Convenes in Grenada Next Week

The human rights issue is bound to be the major topic of discussion at next week's OAS General Assembly meeting in Grenada, even though there are other important matters to be considered. Many of the delegates still have reservations about holding the meeting in Grenada because of continued reports of poor facilities, water shortages, and typhoid fever outbreaks. None has decided to back out, however, and the participants seem resigned to grinning and bearing some inconveniences.

Most delegates are anxious to meet Secretary of State Vance and get some insight into the Latin American policies of the new US administration and its ideas for restructuring the OAS. The majority of Latin American countries have had little contact with high US administration officials and, in general, have been confused by conflicting signals they have been receiving from Washington.

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The human rights issue has been the core of the problem. There have been reports that the southern cone countries have been attempting to form a common front in opposition to the US on this issue. The foreign ministers of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and possibly Brazil, in fact, may meet before the conference convenes to talk over tactics and the possibility of raising international terrorism as a counter-debate to human rights. None of the countries is anxious to offend the US, however, and protestations against Washington's human rights policy will probably be perfunctory, but emotional.

Other topics on the General Assembly agenda include: restructuring the OAS, charter reform, cooperation on development and collective economic security, and educational/cultural exchange programs. Bolivia's desire for an outlet to the sea and the Guatemala-Belize territorial dispute may be raised, but probably will be tabled with simple statements for the record. Panama may bring up the progress of the canal treaty negotiations, but a joint US-Panama report on the status of the negotiations probably will be agreed upon before the meeting.

As it shapes up now, the General Assembly could bog down on human rights discussions. None of the participants, however, wants a rankling debate. Most delegates want to get the Grenada meeting over with as quickly as possible and carry on the rest of their business in Washington or elsewhere.

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Jamaica: Deteriorating Economic Situation

The recent visit of Rosalynn Carter to Jamaica, coming as it did in the wake of a visit by a US technical team to study the island's economic needs, will be interpreted by Prime Minister Manley's government as presaging substantial financial assistance from Washington.

Although Manley is currently following the advice of political moderates in seeking assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the industrial nations, sufficient financing is proving difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. If Manley's moderate stance fails to produce results in the coming months, we believe he will probably again turn to his radical advisers. The result would likely have significant negative repercussions for US interests. Pressures for a bauxite tax increase would mount, and other nationalistic demands against US investments could follow.

Jamaica faces a sharply tightened foreign exchange bind this year. Although the current-account deficit is declining sharply with the increase in bauxite and alumina sales and continuing import constraints, the capital account will worsen. Higher debt servicing obligations, a further reduction in capital receipts, and continuing capital flight are the causes. Despite severe austerity measures and the probable receipt of an IMF loan, Jamaica still faces a foreign payments gap of about \$90 million in 1977, mainly during the third quarter of the fiscal year.

The battle among Manley's advisers over the government's approach to the economic crisis has so far passed through two distinct stages. The first stage culminated in January--about a month into Manley's second term--and represented a high-water mark for the influence of ruling

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party radicals. Beholden to his young Marxist-oriented advisers for their help in his party's sweeping election victory in December, Manley named several of them to key ministries responsible for implementing social change. Then in a speech on January 19 Manley:

--Announced a confiscatory tax policy aimed particularly at the middle and upper classes.

--Assigned the radical wing of his party, together with some leftist university economists, the task of designing an emergency production program.

--Said he was making overtures to the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic and Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and would also look to the USSR for economic assistance.

--Vilified the IMF and stated that his government would not sacrifice its social projects to meet IMF conditions.

By late April, however, Manley had significantly altered course, and in the second round of the battle to determine government policy party moderates emerged the clear winners. Disappointed by the response from CEMA and by the failure of the radicals to devise a program that would get the economy moving, Manley rejected the radical's economic scheme. Turning once again to his more orthodox economic advisers, he submitted a plan intended to meet the stipulations of the IMF--expected to include devaluing the currency and slashing government spending. At the same time, party moderates--led especially by Foreign Minister Patterson--began strenuously to oppose the radicals' efforts to expand their power base in the government and party.

The radicals have been regrouping and waiting for an opportunity to prove to Manley that they are correct in contending that there has been no basic change in US policy toward Jamaica. They have taken pains to dissociate themselves from attempts to obtain assistance from the West. Although two leading radicals were named to the Jamaican team that consulted with the US economic

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mission, both absented themselves from every session. Moreover, the radicals have tried to undermine relations with the US by apparently planting a story in the press designed to raise false expectations concerning the amount of future US assistance.

If the economic crisis worsens, the result will be heightened political instability. As Jamaicans experience mounting unemployment, spiraling inflation, and unavailability of basic goods, Manley is likely to suffer a significant loss in popular support. As intra-party tensions increase, Manley will find it increasingly difficult to hold his party together.

Unless Jamaica can find more foreign financial help than is now in sight, Manley will have essentially two options in closing the remaining gap: to tough it out, or to again boost bauxite taxes. If he chooses the first option, Jamaica faces the prospect of having to slash imports from last year's depressed level by as much as 20 percent to \$735 million in 1977. Severe payments problems would persist over the next few years, requiring continued stiff austerity measures--which would likely cause more political problems for the Manley government.

We believe the odds are strongly against another bauxite tax increase as long as Manley believes further foreign financial assistance will be forthcoming. If this fails, he probably will turn to his radical advisers. A bauxite tax increase and other nationalistic pressures against US investments on the island could well follow. In these circumstances, relations with the US would deteriorate rapidly.

At the same time, Manley probably would seek closer relations with Cuba. Although he apparently has been disappointed by the inadequacy of Soviet aid offers thus far, his attempt to lessen dependence on the US could also lead to increased overtures to the USSR. Moscow is unlikely to provide cash aid, although the Soviets have indicated some trade arrangement could be worked out, probably involving small purchases of bauxite and alumina.

Even if Jamaica nails down sufficient foreign loans to cover its payments gap this year, it is important not to exaggerate the benefits for the US. Manley's domestic

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goal of creating a "democratic socialist" society is irreversible. The best Washington can hope for is to strengthen the moderates so that the process will take place within a framework that assures as little human dislocation as possible.

Manley's commitment to aligning Jamaica with the third world is also unshakable. By persuading him that the US has an abiding interest in pursuing a relationship of mutual respect, we may well be able to deal with our differences in an atmosphere free from last year's undertones of fundamental hostility and avoid pushing him toward an identification with the more radical members of the third world.

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Argentina: Political Revival?

Some Argentine politicians and prominent citizens are emerging from more than a year of near public silence with a variety of statements and proposals, all aimed at restoring political activity, which has been officially suspended since the March 1976 coup.

Leaders of the Peronist movement, still the nation's largest political grouping, have become more vocal than at any time since the military takeover--although they have been carefully stressing that their aims are not political. Peronists belonging to a group whose purposes are ostensibly "cultural," as opposed to "political," have chosen an executive council which will oversee the writing of a statement evaluating the country's current overall situation. Among those undertaking the project are Italo Luder, Federico Angel Robledo, and Nicasio Sanchez Toranzo, all of whom gained prominence during the presidency of the ousted Isabel Peron. Their evaluation, to be issued shortly, is expected to amount to a criticism of the present regime, particularly on the human rights score.

Argentina's second largest party, the Radicals, making its first major statement since the military took over last year, has issued a call for the restoration of "all freedoms." Specifically, the party declared that the junta should lift its ban on the functioning of political parties.

An influential journalist recently proposed the establishment of an organization to be called the "National Reorganization Movement." According to the proposal, the movement would form the basis of a government-sponsored single-party system. The proposal, however, plays down--and perhaps would rule out--meaningful political participation by the principal existing parties, the Radicals and Peronists. A variety of journalists have for some time put forth any number of political ideas and criticisms, but this latest one is the most pointed to date.

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The junta's ban on all blatantly political activity never really achieved total success. Adherents of a variety of views have regularly maneuvered to gain influence with the military in the hope that their respective positions would take hold once the political rules are relaxed. Indeed, the officers themselves fully expect such contacts and use them to advance their own political interests. The recent flurry of political verbiage, however, is the most concentrated effort as yet.

For the current round of proselytizing to get as far as it has, two factors appear to have been essential. One is that a great deal of discussion and opinion-taking have been going on for some time within a number of interested political sectors. The other is that each of the ideas expressed, whether a criticism or a proposal, had at least the tacit support of some influential current of opinion within the armed forces.

The political expression that has surfaced was not necessarily orchestrated by the junta, but it does seem to have had beneficial results for the regime. Since it is firmly in control, the government can easily withstand such criticism, particularly that emanating from the vanquished Peronists. But on another level, the outpouring of opinions seems to have diverted attention from problem areas, such as subversion and the effects of the so-called Graiver case. Moreover, the activity may give greater credibility to President Videla's stated desire for "dialogue" with representative civilian groups. He can point to the latest increase of political criticism and suggestions as proof of his government's willingness to listen.

No one in or out of government seriously suggests that the latest developments presage an early return to any semblance of unfettered civilian politics. Indeed, the major parties probably do not want a rapid normalization, since they are simply not prepared. Nonetheless, it is clear that a new stage of political evolution, characterized by increasing public debate, has been reached and that a great outpouring of ideas is yet to come. It would be difficult for the military to reverse this process without arousing deep, widespread resentment among the populace.

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President Videla hopes to keep this process under control. If it proceeds too fast, hard-line critics may become fearful that the military's authority is being undermined and consequently step up their pressure on him. If the process is gradual, however, Videla will have deprived his military critics of at least one excuse for opposing his tactics.

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Brazil: Political Maneuverings?

Brazilian Army Minister Sylvio Frota's recent high praise for army intelligence and security officers appears calculated both to bolster the esprit de corps of the security service, at a time when student protests are provoking widespread concern, and to improve his own standing within the military. His remarks are especially noteworthy for their political overtones because Frota, as a four-star general, is eligible to become president under the current political guidelines and has been frequently mentioned as a possible successor to President Geisel.

In the past, Frota has been criticized by military conservatives for his steadfast loyalty to Geisel, especially when he was charged with carrying out presidential directives aimed at restraining the security services. Last year, when Geisel fired two senior army officials for their failure to prevent the deaths of civilians under military detention, it appeared that Frota had lost considerable standing within the high command for his failure to intercede.

Frota's speech doubtless goes a long way toward erasing whatever ill-feeling toward him has lingered within the security services. It may also be viewed as an adroit maneuver at a time when Geisel has forbidden overt campaigning on the part of any generals.

If Frota's comments were made with Geisel's approval, however, they could be a signal that the government, angered by the continuing public opposition to its policies, believes that it must invoke stronger security measures. For the past two months, student agitation has spread nationwide in violation of official bans on protest demonstrations. So far, the police and military, clearly under government orders, have been remarkably restrained in their response--confining their actions to dispersing crowds with tear gas and water jets and arresting demonstrators for only short periods.

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Nevertheless, there are growing reports that unemployed workers have joined the students and that they are receiving support from various Communist and left-wing groups, fueling fears of a subversive conspiracy. Frota's speech could well be the prelude to a more violent crackdown in the near future.

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Uruguay: No New Political Ground Broken

It is clear from the gist of a recent speech by President Mendez that the Uruguayan government is unlikely to restore traditional democratic processes soon. Many Uruguayans had hoped that the President would discuss the return of elections and political parties in a recent highly touted press conference. Despite advance billing by the government that it would be significant, the President's message mainly consisted of a long review of Uruguayan political history and philosophy. The speech resulted in harsh criticism of Uruguayan political policy by the media.

Among the points Mendez made, however, the most noteworthy was a clear statement of the government's intention to give high priority to maintaining domestic security to the exclusion, for the time being, of political activities. The President's statement reiterated earlier declarations by military and other government officials that the survival of the nation takes precedence over the promotion of human rights.

Mendez spoke in general terms on a number of political developments including constitutional reform, elections, and political parties. He mentioned no timetable and it was obvious that no major political activities would be permitted in the near future. Instead, he talked of drafting a new political charter in lieu of reworking the present constitution. According to the President, the new document--to be developed by the government and subsequently submitted to the people for ratification--will be based on several institutional acts put into effect following former president Bordaberry's ouster last June.

Mendez said the government would facilitate the return of "traditional" political parties--again, giving no date--but added that the activities of the parties would be regulated. "International parties" such as the Communists will be banned. According to the President, no elections will be held prior to 1981, the end of Mendez'

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mandate, and a thorough review of the efficiency of the electoral process will precede any move toward the restoration of elections.

Mendez broke no new ground in his speech, but reemphasized points that have been made time and again by various government officials. The relative political inactivity of the government is more than a cooling-off period after the "soft coup" last June; it is a sign of a serious lack of leadership in Montevideo. Mendez, who is unpopular with many Uruguayans, is a figurehead executive for the more than 20-member junta of generals. The Mendez administration amounts to a revival of Uruguay's old collegial system of government. Power is diffused among a large number of generals who, like the country, have no dominant leader. Consequently, the junta is unable to move decisively or initiate new policy.

An exception to Uruguay's current lack of leadership is the Fourth Army Division commander, General Gregorio Alvarez, who may emerge in some type of leadership position, especially if senior officers continue to retire on schedule over the next several months. Earlier rumors that the law would be manipulated to allow some more conservative senior officers to remain on active duty for political reasons appear to be unfounded.

The ambitious Alvarez is popular among the people and the army. He has been labeled a political moderate and conceivably might work more rapidly toward political liberalization, especially if it appeared he could attain a top-ranking position. Alvarez is highly critical of the US, however, and a strong advocate of Latin solidarity against the US on the human rights issue.

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Colombia: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields

Reports of the "world's largest" marijuana field in the Guajira region of northeast Colombia have focused official and public attention on the extent and sophistication of cannabis production in the country. Originally reported as 1,500 hectares, the marijuana fields, which are interspersed among other agricultural crops, are now estimated by officials at 200-250 hectares.

Even with the lower estimate, the sector under cultivation is still extensive. Moreover, the report that some 300 farm workers were recruited from neighboring areas to tend the fields, coupled with the discovery of irrigation facilities and modern agricultural implements, is an indication of the commercial and highly professional aspect of the marijuana business in Colombia.

Colombia has long been a principal source of marijuana supply for the US market. Most of it is grown in the rugged Sierra Nevada Mountains in the departments of Magdalena and Cesar. The Guajira, perhaps more infamous as a center for contraband smuggling, also has a reputation for marijuana cultivation.

There are no estimates on the amount of marijuana grown in Colombia, but US Drug Enforcement Administration officials believe that 50- to 80-ton shipments of the drug are routine and that smaller 1- to 2-ton shipments may leave the country several times a day. Most of the marijuana is stored clandestinely on commercial or private vessels which depart from Riohacha, Santa Marta, Barranquilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean seaport cities. In addition, innumerable secret runways facilitate air smuggling. Virtually all of the Colombian marijuana is destined for the US market, entering through the east coast, Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico.

The latest discovery in the Guajira generated a spate of news articles in Colombia calling for tighter narcotics controls. According to the executive secretary

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of the National Council on Dangerous Drugs (NCDD), herbicides which had been considered for eradication of the marijuana field will not be used because of legal and political constraints and because the marijuana is interspersed with legitimate crops. Reportedly, some Colombian government agencies are looking into the possibilities of crop substitution and the development of industry in the Guajira as approaches to future marijuana control.

In the interim, the military is apparently becoming involved in anti-marijuana operations in the area. Similar in design to the Mexican military's "Operation Condor," the Colombian armed forces now are reportedly conducting patrols to locate additional marijuana fields and manning road blocks and patrolling the coast to prevent the shipment of harvested plants.

Considering the state of near anarchy in the volatile Guajira region, the military's participation will be essential for even a modestly successful operation against the marijuana growers and traffickers. Colombia's military establishment, however, dislikes police roles and may not be a willing participant in any government effort directed against marijuana producers. Furthermore, given the feeling of futility in Colombia regarding the overall narcotics trafficking problem, it is unlikely that enforcement officials will be inclined to do much about the innocuously regarded marijuana issue.

The narcotics situation in Colombia could become a minor campaign issue in next year's presidential elections, but the state of the economy and unemployment will predominate. Even if government and enforcement officials were to respond positively to US initiatives regarding marijuana control in Colombia, problems and misunderstandings no doubt would develop over what Bogota doubtlessly sees as an inconsistency between the US domestic policy of decriminalization for marijuana, and US efforts to convince foreign producers that marijuana is a dangerous drug.

Regardless of its political ramifications, marijuana production remains a profitable endeavor for Colombians. Faced with increasing economic hardships, more and more campesinos are likely to sow the lucrative marijuana seed. There have already been reports that small-scale Sierra

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
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Nevada coffee growers, who claim the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (FNC) is not passing on the unprecedented profits from the current high prices, are switching to marijuana cultivation.

According to a news interview with a Colombian farmer, the cultivation of marijuana does not require the costly chemical agents needed to prevent coffee plant diseases. Furthermore, marijuana matures in six months while coffee takes three years to reach maturity. In the Sierra Nevada, marijuana brings 30,000 pesos (\$820) per quintal or 100 kilograms. On the other hand, 125 kilograms of coffee, which constitutes a "load," is worth only 7,300 pesos (\$200) in the Sierra, and there are innumerable difficulties involved in transporting it to the regional centers where the FNC is located.

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Principal Areas of Coca Cultivation



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Peru: Inter-Service Rivalry in Narcotics Control

Peru's Civil Guard is challenging the competence of the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) to act as the senior agency in enforcing drug regulations. The Civil Guard's attempt to gain a larger role in narcotics matters could further reduce current mediocre drug enforcement activities and possibly affect recently proposed reorganizational plans designed to halt illicit coca production and to gradually eliminate all coca cultivation in Peru.

The Civil Guard's maneuvering is partly due to the fact that the specific duties of each service are not clearly defined in the reorganizational proposals. Civil Guard officials insist that they have a role in large cities, where Peruvian Investigations Police offices are located, in addition to their usual duties in towns and rural areas. In mid-April the minister of interior, who has jurisdiction over both organizations, disapproved the Civil Guard's expansion attempts and ruled that the Civil Guard is to restrict its activities to its current jurisdiction. The issue, however, was not settled and the Civil Guard continues to press its claim.

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The most serious charges against the PIP's anti-narcotics activities are corruption and failure to

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prosecute major traffickers. While the Civil Guard takes the lead in making these accusations, similar charges were made in a series of narcotics-related articles that recently appeared in Lima newspapers. In addition, the National Coca Enterprise (ENACO), which is charged with controlling licit coca production, was accused of malfeasance. The writers stated that ENACO's role in the key coca-growing regions of Huanuco and Cajamarca is largely decorative and that the organization devotes little effort to its primary duty of enforcing acreage and production allotments. The articles concluded that the repression of drug smuggling could not be allowed to remain solely in the hands of the Peruvian Investigations Police. Rather, they urged that this function be decentralized and expanded to include the Civil Guard.

The commander of the Peruvian Investigations Police is aware that some of his personnel take bribes and that this provides a convincing argument for the Civil Guard in its expansion campaign.

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Nevertheless, the Civil Guard is making its own study of narcotics activities and documenting cases of drug-related corruption involving PIP officers. This could aggravate the inter-service rivalry and further degrade Peru's narcotics control capabilities.

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Mexico: Accelerated Communist Economic Activity

An East German - Mexican agreement signed in May for joint production of precision instruments highlighted a continuing expansion of Mexico's economic relations with Communist countries. The accord reportedly marks the first such East German investment in a less-developed country and its first contract with Mexico.


The East German ambassador to Mexico also announced that East Germany had provided a \$20-million line of credit for Mexican equipment and machinery purchases. Although the terms of the credit were not made known, they probably will call for a 15 percent down payment, a 10-year repayment period, and up to two years grace at 6 percent interest. East Germany has extended \$100 million of credits (over one half of that in the last 3 years) for machinery and equipment purchases to five Latin American countries--Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, and Uruguay.

Both the joint venture and the \$20-million line of credit were probably steps taken to implement the economic cooperation agreement signed by Mexico and East Germany in February 1976. At that time, the East German vice minister of foreign trade called for several joint industrial projects in the steel and metal machinery industries. The \$20-million credit reportedly will be applied to the expansion of Mexico's Altos Hornos steel plant and the Ciudad Sahagun industrial complex.

Mexico also continued to assert its nonaligned position elsewhere. It was announced in late May that Mexico and Yugoslavia will jointly invest in a furniture factory. Yugoslavia will provide technical assistance and possibly small amounts of aid for machinery purchases as well. Mexico also is considering a Romanian offer to provide technical assistance for the state of Aguascalientes' grape industry and is in the final stages of negotiations with Bucharest for a broad program in petroleum cooperation. In May, Czechoslovakia purchased Mexican

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tobacco, marking the first known Mexican sale to Prague this year, and China signed for its first direct shipment of Mexican cotton for processing in China. Although less than 1 percent of Mexico's trade is with Communist countries, the volume is expected to increase.



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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY FOR MAY 1977

- May 1 May Day in Havana. Speech by Roberto Viega, member of PCC Central Committee, secretary general of CTC.
- 3 Representatives of Caribbean Communist parties meet in Havana to discuss area situation. Had attended May Day ceremonies in Cuba.
- Two American diplomats return from interviewing Americans in prison in Cuba. Twenty-four Americans in jail in Cuba, seven of them on political charges.
- Fidel Castro attends CTC reception in honor of foreign labor delegations attending May Day activities.
- Fidel Castro meets with Caribbean Communist delegations in Cuba for May Day ceremonies.
- 4 Havana Domestic Service carries item critical of Ambassador Young's speech at ECLA meeting in Guatemala.
- Cuban Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font meets with Algerian President Boumediene in Algiers.
- Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Prime Minister Manley in Kingston. He briefs Manley on Castro's trip to Africa.
- 6 Fidel Castro interviewed by *Afrique-Asie*. Big blast at China. Angola a non-negotiable issue with US. "Partial lifting of embargo not enough".

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- May 19 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez--in Moscow for the 81st meeting of the CEMA Executive Committee--meets with Chairman Kosygin.
- In an interview with Barbara Walters, Fidel Castro says Cuba stopped withdrawing troops from Angola in April because of French and Moroccan intervention in Zaire's Shaba Province.
- 20 Dominic Urbang, Chairman of Luxembourg Communist Party arrives in Cuba with delegation. Meets with Fidel Castro during visit.
- Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Belgrade en route to Libya. Meets with Yugoslav Communist Party leaders at airport.
- Education Ministry inaugurates Cuban branch of the Russian Language Institute.
- Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Tripoli, Libya.
- 21 Manuel Pineiro, member of Central Committee and head of America Department, meets with delegation from Colombian Communist Party visiting Cuba.
- 21 - 28 Cuba-Jamaica Intergovernmental Commission meets in Havana. Program of cooperation for the coming year is signed.
- 24 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Algeria. Meets with President Boumediene. Brings message from Castro. Gives Boumediene Castro's evaluation of situation in the area.
- Cuba and Ethiopia sign public health cooperation agreement.

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- May 9 - 13 CEMA meeting on petroleum and gas industry held in Havana.
- 9 - 15 Week of solidarity with Palestinian people observed in Cuba.
- 11 Havana Domestic Service reports US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved amendment partially revoking trade embargo.
- Cuba and Canada sign fishing agreement. Permits Cuban fishing within Canada's 200 mile zone.
- Delegation from Venezuelan Communist Party meet with PCC group headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to discuss the international situation.
- 14 - 17 Fifth congress of National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) held in Havana.
- 15 Congolese Workers Party delegation arrives in Cuba.
- 16 Interview with Castro appears in *Afrique-Asie*. Every attack against Angola is an attack against Cuba. "Consolidation of Ethiopian revolution important for Africa."
- 18 Representatives of Ethiopian and Cuban public health ministries open bilateral cooperation talks in Addis Ababa.
- Fidel Castro speaks to closing session of ANAP congress. "Growth is no longer romantic." "Party must have a policy on population."
- Luz de las Nieves Ayres Moreno, a Chilean revolutionary, arrives in Havana.

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- May 26 International Day of Solidarity with African people held in Cuba.
- Council of Ministers Vice President Belarmino Castilla Mas meets with Jamaican Minister of Mines Dudley Thompson in Havana.
- 27 Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca receives new Libyan ambassador, Mr. Ali Sunni Al-Muntasir.
- Carlos Rafael Rodriguez returns from his visits to the USSR, Libya, and Algeria.
- 28 Cuban Communist Party delegation, headed by Central Committee member Facundo Martinez Vaillant received by Guinean President Sekou Toure.
- 31 Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, arrives in Cuba.

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